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Many animal rights activists agree that pain is univer-
sally felt, spanning human-animal barriers to encompass all 
living, or embodied, things. Elizabeth Costello, the aging 
female novelist central to J. M. Coetzee’s novella, utilizes a 
series of metaphors in her lecture The Philosophers and the 
Animals to compare animal suffering to human suffering. 
Coetzee uses the character of Costello as a lens for addressing 
the ethical boundaries of horror and what it means to not only 
be cognizant of immense suffering, but to willfully ignore 
“places of death” as an entire community.1 I will explore the 
ethical boundary between human suffering and animal cruelty 
as seen in the metaphors presented by Coetzee’s Costello in her 
first lecture, The Philosophers and the Animals: the comparison 
of the meat industry to the Third Reich, and mass animal 
slaughter to the Nazi death camps. It is too reductionist to claim 
that Costello is a stand-in for Coetzee, yet they share similar 
life experiences and a pessimistic outlook on the ability of 
society to progress. The latter distances himself from his own 
beliefs by utilizing fictional interlocutors, allowing for an 
expansive examination of the multiplicities inherent in hege-
                                                
1 J. M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), 35.  
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monic evaluations of suffering, the nonpower inherent in 
power.2 
Is it ethical, from a philosophical standpoint as well as 
a literary one, to draw upon the horrors of the Holocaust in a 
metaphor referencing the mass slaughter of animals? Are there 
specific moments in history that are too appalling and deeply 
personal to ever appropriately use as a point of comparison in a 
contemporary argument? Coetzee clearly takes the issue of 
human mistreatment of animals seriously, as his protagonist’s 
chosen metaphorics equate human cruelty towards animals with 
the calculated murder of millions of Jews in the Holocaust. 
Coetzee presented his pseudo-lecture, the novella itself, at the 
1997-98 Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, both reveal-
ing and veiling his opinions on the way human beings treat 
animals in our capitalistic society.3 Through Costello’s chosen 
metaphors, we see Coetzee’s own moral opprobrium with the 
meat industry, as well as his understanding of how audiences, 
representative of society in microcosm, perceive and respond to 
his arguments. The comparison between the victims of fascism 
and factory farms is not inherently objectionable when in the 
form of a literary device, solely because figurative devices in 
literature do not carry a burden of proof. They are meant to 
illustrate an idea, not substantiate it. It is too simple to claim 
that the comparison lessens the tragedy of the Holocaust and 
the pain felt; in fact, this line of reasoning precludes the 
                                                
2 Jacques Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to 
Follow),” Critical Inquiry 28, no. 2 (2002): 396. Derrida explores 
multiple questions with the reader on the ability of animals to feel 
suffering. He asks, “What of the vulnerability felt on the basis of this 
inability? What is this nonpower at the heart of power? What is its 
quality of modality? How should one account for it? What right 
should be accorded it? To what extent does it concern us? Being able 
to suffer is no longer a power, it is a possibility without power, a 
possibility of the impossible.” I think it is productive to engage the 
possibility that Coetzee used his lecture to respond to Derrida’s ideas.   
3 Amy Gutmann, introduction to The Lives of Animals, ed. J. M. 
Coetzee (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 3.  
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acknowledgment that animals have souls and can thus suffer. 
However, what metrics exist for measuring the ethical applica-
bility of figurative language, the level of sensitivity surrounding 
historically charged words and phrases? In what ways does 
Coetzee himself escape culpability because he presents the 
comparison through the words of a fictional lecturer?  
Costello’s metaphor in her lecture The Philosophers 
and Animals, while controversial, aptly illuminates the tragedy 
of the meat industry. It helps underline the gravity of how 
humans oppress nonhuman animals and escape culpability. 
However, one reason Costello’s metaphor is so shocking—and 
can be argued insensitive—is because she does not assure her 
audience of the ways in which her comparison could be 
perceived as offensive. She fails to address the ways in which 
history integrates itself into present discussions, so that the 
Holocaust is not less important because it happened in the past 
and cannot be reconciled (as the meat industry of the present 
day can.) Her fatal flaw is in replacing an equal sign with a 
greater than sign, claiming that the meat industry is worse than 
what the Third Reich unrolled. She states that “an enterprise of 
degradation, cruelty, and killing” exists that “rivals anything 
that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed dwarfs it” (21).4  
However, Costello does not discomfit her audience be-
cause this correlation is ungrounded, or because she does not 
qualify her subject matter enough. Rather, Costello’s lecture 
makes her audience uncomfortable because it “breaks with the 
expected academic norms” thus provoking “awkward emotional 
exchanges” as pointed out by Frances Mascia-Lees, an Ameri-
can anthropologist.5 We can see this in the decisive letter 
Abraham Stern, a professor at Appleton College, sends to 
Costello, calling her out for trading “on the horrors of the 
camps in a cheap way” and insulting “the memory of the dead” 
                                                
4 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 21.  
5 Frances E. Mascia-Lees and Patricia Sharpe, “Introduction to 
Cruelty, Suffering, Imagination: The Lessons of J. M. Coetzee” 
American Anthropologist 108 (2006): 84.  
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(50).6 Coetzee presents us with a protagonist who addresses her 
audience directly, claiming no pretense. She deviates from 
polite conversation with an apology that sounds much more like 
an indictment, asking her audience to “pardon the tastelessness 
of the following” before theorizing about the body fat of 
Treblinka’s victims being used as in ingredient in soap (21-
22).7 We are so shocked by her words that we cannot process 
the greater meaning behind them. The metaphor falls flat.  
From a historical point of view, Costello’s metaphor is 
appropriate. According to Boria Sax, the term “Holocaust” 
originally denoted “a Hebrew sacrifice in which the entire 
animal was given to Yahweh to be consumed with fire” (156).8 
In a weird twist, a form of animal exploitation—animal killed 
for spiritual offering—became the chosen metaphor for the 
murder of millions of Jews by the Nazi Germans. The very term 
“Holocaust” alludes to and denotes animal suffering. And if 
literature seeks to illuminate the human experience and the 
ways in which we move through the world, metaphors help 
elucidate what lies within us. David Sztybel, a philosopher 
specializing in animal ethics, wrote an intriguing essay defend-
ing the metaphor of the Holocaust victims to animals in the 
meat industry. He claims that in asking if we dare point out “the 
chilling similarities between how Jews were treated in the 
Holocaust and how animals are treated in the present day” we 
are really asking if human beings are of “superior moral 
significance relative to nonhuman animals” (98).9 Sztybel’s 
selected similarities stand the test: displacement, separation 
from family, voicelessness, unfathomable amount of deaths, 
namelessness, transported in confined places, and a disowning 
of responsibility by the perpetrators, coupled with conditioned 
                                                
6 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 50. 
7 Ibid., 21-22.  
8 Boria Sax, Animals in the Third Reich: Pets, Scapegoats, and the 
Holocaust (New York: Continuum, 2000), 156.  
9 David Sztybel, “Can the Treatment of Animals Be Compared to the 
Holocaust?” Ethics and the Environment 11 (2006): 98.  
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indifference. This removes the systems of power that we see in 
differentiating “man” from “animal” and replaces both with the 
identifier of sufferer. And yet, instead of enumerating the 
horrors of the meat industry and its procedures, Costello 
discusses facts about the Holocaust and leaves it up to those in 
attendance to draw the parallels, the very people she earlier 
notes whom can only “comprehend the deaths of others” by 
thinking of the victims “one at a time” (19).10   
Audience members at The Philosophers and the Ani-
mals lecture view Elizabeth Costello as removed from society, 
entertaining if not completely delusional. She does not really 
have much power in effecting change or elevating her audience 
to the state of heightened moral awareness that she herself 
inhabits because her uncomfortable pauses and alarming 
analogies alienate her. Thus, we see a correlation between an 
escalated sensitivity to animal abuse and a fall in social status, 
as Costello moves from expert to outcast, celebrated to criti-
cized, influential to delusional. An element of attenuated 
agency exists within each listener, as they can visually see what 
happens to someone who has such an extreme aversion to the 
meat industry and its practices—you will be seen as strange, 
incoherent, and disorganized. 
This begs the question, why did Coetzee make Costello 
his protagonist? Why give her such a weak voice, a voice that 
lacks gravitas and conviction in making her case against animal 
cruelty? An art critic, Ward Jones, argues that the main lesson 
of The Lives of Animals is how “the portrait that we have of an 
ethical informant” can contribute to the way we evaluate the 
argument at hand (209).11 Costello begins her lecture asking her 
audience to “concede” to her “the rhetorical power to evoke 
these horrors and bring them home to you with adequate force” 
which is ironic as she is relatively powerless in evoking a good 
                                                
10 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 19.  
11 Ward E. Jones, “Elizabeth Costello and the Biography of the Moral 
Philosopher,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 69 (2011): 
209.  
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response (19).12 Why does Coetzee choose a voice that is 
elderly, scattered, and alarmist as the instrument for perpetuat-
ing his ideas? I agree with the literature arguing that “fictional 
narratives can possess ethical authority” but think that the 
choice to make that ethical authority questionable is an ingen-
ious ploy by Coetzee (209).13 Costello’s weak authority and 
flaws as a public speaker reflect the thoughts of an author who 
knows that his position is trivialized in and disruptive to 
popular thought. This shows that Coetzee does not believe 
society can recognize the severity or extent of this kind of mass 
cruelty and change. He concedes to the moral apathy of humans 
and the limited potential for an expansion of human empathy 
for animals, as they are non-human and thus other. Coetzee 
identifies with the futility of serving as a moral persuader, and 
turns to the use of interlocutors to stir the pot for him, to present 
ideas that resonate with both the pedagogue and the participant.  
Coetzee develops these interlocutors to start a conver-
sation on the concept of cruelty. If pain is a universal sensation 
felt, then cruelty inflicted on an animal is just as horrific as 
cruelty inflicted on a human. What does it mean to be a conduit 
capable of inflicting suffering and cruelty on other living 
creatures? It is hard to answer this question because a “uniform 
or ubiquitous cross-cultural concept of ‘cruelty’ towards 
animals” does not exist (129).14 While global watchdogs for 
human rights operate around commonly accepted ideals of 
morality and justice, international organizations protecting the 
rights of animals find it much harder to make universal claims, 
as there is no cross-cultural acceptance of where animals stand 
                                                
12Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 19. 
13Jones, “Elizabeth Costello and the Biography of the Moral Philoso-
pher,” 209. 
14Agustin Fuentes, “The Humanity of Animals and the Animality of 
Humans: A View From Biological Anthropology Inspired by J. M. 
Coetzee’s ‘Elizabeth Costello’” American Anthropologist 108 (2006): 
129.  
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in relation to humans. But what if we are not in the position of 
pain-inflictor, but in the position of pain-witness?  
Costello makes it clear that the Germans who “lived in 
the countryside” around the Nazi death camps “could not afford 
to know” what took place within the camps (19).15 They 
rejected a reality that was too painful to accept. But she does 
not disparage these people as uniquely immoral—rather, their 
actions were reflective of the average German citizen. Camps 
covered the Reich like sores. Just as the majority of Americans 
live in close proximity to places where meat is produced, 
distributed, or sold, Costello argues “few Germans lived more 
than a few kilometers from a camp of some kind” (20).16 
Evidence of immense cruelty and horror was in the air, swirled 
across some pathway of the conscious, even if it could not be 
fully explicated or clearly labeled. Costello claims that humans 
utilize ignorance as a survival mechanism when faced with 
mass-scale suffering. The actions of the Germans behind the 
camp were so appalling that the average German citizen needed 
to disassociate in order to keep his or her sanity. They chose to 
be willfully ignorant.  
Costello’s lecture is ultimately an appeal to examine 
how human beings sympathize, or refuse to sympathize, with 
those they do not identify with, those that remain in the 
ambiguous category of other—or, more aptly—nonhuman. 
Costello associates willful ignorance with a purposeful refusal 
to acknowledge embodied-beings. She claims that merely being 
alive “is to be a living soul” (33).17 Thus, animals, a domain 
encompassing human beings, all possess embodied souls. 
Through her dialogue on embodiment, we see glimpses of 
Coetzee’s philosophy emerging. He urges the reader to 
acknowledge that the majority of individuals fail to recognize 
the capacity of all embodied things to suffer, just as the 
fictional lecture attendees fail to recognize the magnitude of 
                                                
15Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 19. 
16 Ibid., 20.  
17 Ibid., 33. 
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Costello’s argument. Jacques Derrida explores the idea of an 
animal’s ability to suffer. If humans are the agents in power, 
and they define what is nonhuman, than asking the question, 
“Can animals suffer?” is analogous to asking if animals can not 
be able to suffer. He further probes, to what extent should we 
be concerned with the ability of an animal to suffer, if “being 
able to suffer is no longer a power” but a “possibility without 
power” (396).18 Would not animals gain superiority over man if 
they were unable to suffer? And yet, this cannot be true. And it 
is problematic if individuals recognize this capacity to suffer. If 
an individual recognizes the capacity of all embodied things—
creatures with a heart and soul—to suffer, then cruelty gains 
more weight. Animal cruelty moves from a necessary evil, 
something you grimace at but continue to ignore, to a grave 
injustice that requires action. Suddenly, the confinement of 
animals stuffed into boxes, pens, coops, and cages becomes as 
glaringly offensive as the confinement of humans in cattle cars.  
I want to extend Coetzee’s thinking and propose that 
Costello misses something crucial by making this a binary 
response—sympathizing or refusing to sympathize. A variety of 
obstacles to human sympathy for suffering exist: not knowing, 
willfully not knowing (as Costello highlights), compassion 
fatigue (the inability to invest the tremendous emotional energy 
that sympathy requires for every injustice), and apathy from the 
feeling of impotence in the face of overwhelming injustice or 
cruelty. Therefore, a lack of sympathy is not always a psycho-
logical defense on behalf of the person witnessing suffering. I 
believe people consciously or unconsciously place their 
psychological suffering on one scale with the ethical behavior 
they wish they could exhibit on the other scale. The scale tips 
towards the heavier desire. By ignoring all of these nuances, 
Costello simplifies the problem of animal cruelty to a point that 
can be easily dismissed by her audience. They perceive her 
points as both radical and irrelevant. This failure on Costello’s 
part makes me question Coetzee’s viewpoint, as he created 
                                                
18Derrida, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” 396. 
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Costello’s failure. Perhaps if we can recognize the earnestness 
in which Costello believes her moral knowledge to be true, we 
can also empathize with the frustration of a fruitless mission 
and the inability to will a group to action. And yet, identifying 
with Costello proves exceedingly challenging.   
Costello’s Holocaust metaphor, if it is to be viewed as a 
vehicle for illuminating commonalities, serves its purpose by 
highlighting a lack of sympathy for living beings deemed 
“nonhuman.” Psychologists studying anthropomorphism 
elucidate this idea of nonhuman versus human by putting 
humanness on a continuum. They claim that through anthropo-
morphism “individuals can attribute humanlike capacities to 
nonhuman agents” and through dehumanization they can also 
“fail to attribute these same capacities to other people” (228).19 
While the former mode leads to more moral concern for the 
subject, the latter incites moral detachment. This process makes 
it easier to excuse immoral actions. Costello’s lecture discom-
fits her audience not just because it centers on an analogy to the 
Holocaust, but because it suggests that human cruelty towards 
other humans is no worse than human cruelty towards animals. 
It is easy for us to see “animality in humans,” as most people 
regard Nazi leaders in the Holocaust as morally repugnant and 
thus bestial, but it is harder for us to see the “humanity in 
animals” when this means an integral part of our everyday 
lives—eating meat—is rooted in the suffering of fellow 
creatures (130).20  
 Towards the end of her lecture, Costello returns to the 
death camps to discuss the true horror of the Holocaust—the 
inability of the German perpetrators to “think themselves into 
                                                
19 A. Waytz, J. Cacioppo, and N. Epley, “Who Sees Human?: The 
Stability and Importance of Individual Differences in Anthropomor-
phism,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 5 (2010): 228.  
20 Fuentes, “The Humanity of Animals and the Animality of Humans: 
A View From Biological Anthropology Inspired by J. M. Coetzee’s 
‘Elizabeth Costello,’” 130. 
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the place of their victims” that rattle away in a cattle-car (34).21 
Just as the majority of Germans “closed their hearts” to the 
faculty of sympathy, so does Costello’s audience fail to imagine 
themselves in the body of Costello (34).22 Her own son, whose 
thoughts Coetzee brings us into, thinks her lecture was a 
“strange talk” both “ill gauged” and “ill argued” (36).23 He 
believes she should not be there. Norma, his wife, wants to 
publicly humiliate Costello by asking a malevolent question. 
Costello calls for sympathy, yet we see Coetzee’s two main 
characters deny her compassion. Her appeal is fruitless.  
Just as the audience fails to sympathize with the speaker, so 
I believe that Coetzee satirizes the proclivity of humans to cling 
to ignorance rather than move to action. Costello claims that 
“there are people who have the capacity to imagine themselves 
as someone else” but the overwhelming majority of people 
“have the capacity but choose not to exercise it” (35).24 Humans 
will choose being accepted over being ostracized, even if the 
choice compromises moral norms. History, as seen through the 
Holocaust analogy, continues to prove that those who challenge 
the status quo face ostracism while the ignorant remain safe in 
their country homes. Nazi rhetoric encouraged people to reject 
identifying with Jews. We are similarly conditioned to be 
entirely indifferent to animal suffering as it has become an 
integral part of our society, and those who reject it are cast out 
as pariahs.  
Coetzee proffers an indictment on Elizabeth Costello to the 
reader as well. She alienates herself from her audience through 
her morally superior attitude, seen in moments when she claims 
that she can think her way “into the existence of a bat or a 
chimpanzee or an oyster” because they “share the substrate of 
life” with her (35).25 She posits herself as a witness to a 
                                                
21 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 34. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid., 36. 
24 Ibid., 35. 
25 Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, 35. 
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holocaust who refuses to remain silent, rendering her audience 
members the German people of the countryside who witness 
horror and choose willful ignorance. She claims that “each day 
is a new holocaust” and yet “our moral being [remains] 
untouched” and we do not “feel tainted” (35).26 Costello makes 
each new day a harbinger of horrific tragedy. Each day is a new 
holocaust. And each day, we shield our morality from affront, 
to the point where we are inoculated against the brutality. She 
suggests that her audience members are tainted—an affront to 
each member’s moral code that she herself evades. 
In Costello’s voice and actions, we see Coetzee the au-
thor posing the question: Does individual awareness bring 
about any real change, especially if she or he takes an extreme-
ly isolating stance? There is power in his subtlety of narrative 
authority, and Coetzee’s prose reflects an acute awareness of 
the inherent animal suffering in the meat industry. His vision 
for audience response, both the fictional audience receiving 
Costello and the real audience of readers, is bleak—he packag-
es a story in a lecture in which the majority of characters cannot 
change their mindsets or expand their perspectives. Beyond 
that, the individual is relatively weak in her power to effect 
change, especially because Costello’s main arguments remain 
rooted in a metaphor that links the meat industry to a dark, 
indisputably incomprehensible moment in human history. We 
think we have already been morally aroused after the horrors of 
the Holocaust, and that suffering of that magnitude cannot 
possibly be repeated. But just as incidents of genocide took 
place before World War II with the Armenians of the Ottoman 
Empire, and subsequently persisted throughout the twentieth 
century in Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Rwanda, so do 
grave injustices against living creatures exist in the present day.  
The lecture ends abruptly: “We can do anything and get 
away with it… there is no punishment” (25).27 But is not the 
calculated cruelty of a few at the top of the meat industry worse 
                                                
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid.  
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than the willful ignorance assumed by the majority of human 
beings towards animal cruelty? Coetzee’s fictional scaffolding 
around the subject of animal cruelty in the meat industry allows 
for an inward turn; which character acts in a way I would? The 
reader is privy to the scene but not participating in it. You are 
not tasked with gauging your reaction because you are not 
acting—you are watching. It is almost as if Coetzee presents 
you with the choice between kindness and cruelty itself, 
knowing you will guiltily choose the latter, but from afar. You 
have the privilege of choosing from a private locale, away from 
the fictional group of people in attendance. He knows you will 
not change your perspective, even if a tinge of guilt leaks into 
your conscious. While we do not hold the knives that slit the 
throats of chickens nor press the buttons that systematically 
asphyxiate cattle, we do not question how our meat reaches our 
plates as perfectly symmetrical patties. When activism presses 
up against alienation, humans usually choose the status quo, if 
for nothing more than self-preservation. We willfully ignore the 
suffering of those whom we cannot identify with, feeling 
morally exempt from a murder we did not commit. For being 
the animals in power, humans are quite powerless in effecting 
change.  
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